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TIMES MARCHES ON: THE COURTS' CONTINUING EXPANSION OF THE
APLICATON OF THE "AcTuAL MALICE" STANDARD
I. Introduction
The area of defamation has proved itself to be a fertile area for constitutional
jurisprudential thought. Within seven short years, beginning with the New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan decision,' the Supreme Court of the United States
has developed a federal constitutional law of libel which has strictly limited the
rights of a public official,2 public figure,3 or a private citizen who is involved in
an incident of "public interest" 4 to sue for defamation, while expanding the First
Amendment right of fair comment on matters of public concern." The standard
enunciated by the Court in the Times case requires the showing of "actual
malice" in order for a public official to recover for defamatory falsehoods relating
to his official conduct.6
The Court began with the constitutional rule requiring actual malice clearly
limited to "public officials" and involving their "public duties," extended it
through various "intermediate" decisions,' and has now applied it to candidates
for public office,8 cases of mistaken identity involving public officials,9 ambiguous
statements in governmental commission reports attributing certain reprehensible
conduct to a public official,"0 and finally, to private individuals involved in mat-
ters of public concern."
It is the purpose of this note to examine the history and development (pro-
gression, if you will) of the scope of the First Amendment-qualified privilege in
the law of defamation, together with an analysis of the current limits of the Times
doctrine, and an examination of lower court applications of the "actual malice"
standard.
II. Pre New York Times
Traditionally, there are two defenses to the law of defamation: truth and
privilege.'2 It was the generally accepted rule prior to 1964 that a newspaper
had at least a qualified or conditional privilege to make fair comment on mat-
ters of public concern.'3 The majority of courts, however, allowed recovery to
* Third-year law student at the University of Notre Dame Law School.
1 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
2 Id.
3 Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
4 Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 39 U.S.L.W. 4694 (U.S. June 7, 1971).
5 See PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 812-16 (3rd ed. 1964) for an excellent
discussion of the common law right of a newspaper to make honest, objective, fair comments on
issues of public concern.
6 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, at 279-80 (1964). See section III,
infra, for a more complete examination of the "actual malice" standard.
7 See section III, infra, for a discussion of the expansion of the Times principle through
various specific decisions.
8 Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265 (1971).
9 Ocala Star-Banner Co. v. Damron, 401 U.S. 295 (1971).
10 Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279 (1971).
11 Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 39 U.S.L.W. 4694 (U.S. June 7, 1971).
12 1 HARPER AND JAMES, THE LAw OF ToRTs 415-19, 421-56 (1956).
13 See PROSSER, supra note 5, at 805-23 as to a discussion of the defense of qualified privi-
lege to defend publications concerning public officials.
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a public official without the requirement of showing that the statements were
motivated by actual malice, that is, feelings of spite or ill will,' if the statements
made about him went bey, id the bounds of fair comment. 5 To state a cause of
action it was sufficient to show that the statement was false and defamatory,
and that the plaintiff's reputation among a respectable segment of the community
had been impaired.'
There was a substantial minority view, however, that even false statements
of fact were qualifiedly privileged, in the absence of malice, at least as far as
they related to public officers and candidates, if made with an honest belief in
their veracity, and with the public interest in mind.'7 The rationale behind this
approach was that the public information media should not be shackled by the
fear of suit (with the resulting necessity to prove the truth of the statements)
simply because they published statements detrimental to the reputation of certain
public officials, if the statements concern matters of public interest.'" It is quite
clearly this rationale that provided the framework for the Supreme Court's land-
mark decision in 1964.
III. The Constitutional Law of Libel
A. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan and the "Actual Malice" Standard
"Liberty to know, to utter and argue freely according to conscience is above
all liberties."' 9
"The power of the licensor against which John Milton directed his assault
by his 'Appeal for the Liberty of Unlicensed Printing' is pernicious not
merely by reason of the censure of particular comments but by reason of
the threat to censure comments on matters of public concern. It is not
merely the sporadic abuse of power by the censor but the pervasive threat
inherent in its very existence that constitutes the danger to freedom of
discussion."20
"Thus we consider this dase against the background of a profound national
commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be unin-
hibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement,
caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public
officials." 2'
The Times case involved allegedly defamatory statements made about an
elected Commissioner of Public Affairs of the City of Montgomery, Alabama,
which appeared in an editorial advertisement in the New York Times entitled,
14 Id. at 814; see also Annot., 110 A.L.R. 412-35 (1937).
15 See authority collected in Annot., 150 A.L.R. 358-62 (1944).
16 1 HARPER AND JAMES, supra note 12, at 350.
17 See authority collected in Annot., 110 A.L.R. 412, 435-41 (1937); 150 A.L.R. 358, 362-
65 '(1944); see also Coleman v. MacLennan, 78 Kan. 711, 98 P. 281 (1908), a leading case
for the minority, where recovery was disallowed for false statements without proof of malice.
18 See PROSSER, supra note 5, at 815, n.82.
19 J. MILTON, AEROPAGITICA.
20 Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97 (1940).
21 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
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"Heed Their Rising Voices." 22 The editorial was published on behalf of the
Negro right-to-vote movement and the Negro student movement. Contained
within it were charges of incidents of police brutality, bigotry and outright intimi-
dation of various black activist groups, along with a general protestation of such
abuses and a call for financial support in aid of these movements. Contained
within the editorial were various and sundry misstatements of fact, in kind and
degree, as to the actual incidents involved.23 In his suit against four individuals
who were Negroes and Alabama clergymen, and the publisher of the editorial,
the New York Times Company, the plaintiff, L. B. Sullivan, claimed that the
facts alleged in the editorial were, first of all, grossly misstated; and secondly, that
they so intimated him in their "charges" as to cause a deleterious effect upon his
reputation as a Commissioner of Montgomery.24 A jury in the Circuit Court of
Montgomery found the defendants liable and rendered judgment for $500,000.2
Defendants appealed. The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed."'
The precise question which the Supreme Court of the United States was to
decide was: Do the "constitutional protections for speech and press limit a
State's power to award damages in a libel action brought by a public official
against critics of his official conduct" even where the statements are false or
clearly erroneous?2 The Supreme Court answered with a qualified "yes." The
Court held that the public has a constitutionally protected right to criticize a
public official's discharge of his official duties,28 and the Alabama rule of law
which states that words published are libelous per se if they tend to injure a
person (who may be a public official) in his reputation or injure him in his public
office or impute misconduct to him in his office~is inconsistent with the guarantees
of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. " A conditional or qualified privilege
immunizing honest mistakes of fact in a publication concerning official conduct
is required by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. " Liability is founded only
upon a showing of "actual malice," i.e., knowledge that the facts represented are
false or acting with reckless disregard as to the truth or falsity of the statements
made. 1
A majority of the Court held that the defense of fair comment on matters
of public concern must be afforded for honest expression of opinion based on
22 Id. at 305, appendix.
23 Id. at 258-59.
24 Id.
25 Id. at 256.
26 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 273 Ala. 656, 144 So. 2d 25 (1962).
27 376 U.S. 254, 256 (1964).
28 The Court reasoned that the public's right to have all the facts necessary for "un-
inhibited, robust, and wide-open" debate cannot be safeguarded unless innocent error is
protected. At 279, the Court said:
A rule compelling the critic of official conduct to guarantee the truth of all his
factual assertions - and to do so on pain of libel judgments virtually unlimited in
amount- leads to a comparable "self-censorship." . . . would-be critics of official
conduct may be deterred from voicing their criticism, even though it is believed to be
true and even though it is in fact true, because of doubt whether it can be proved in
court or fear of the expense of having to do so.
29 The Court at 273 said:
Criticism of their official conduct '(of government officials) does not lose its constitu-
tional protections for speech and press merely because it is effective criticism and
hence diminishes their official reputations.
30 Id. at 279-83.
31 Id. at 279-80.
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privileged (though incorrect) statements of fact.3 2 "A constitutional guaranty
of freedom of speech and press precludes an otherwise impersonal attack on
governmental operations from being treated as a libel of an official responsible
for those operations.""3 The qualified privilege of criticism of a public official is
analogous to the protection accorded a public official when he is sued for libel by
a private citizen and the allegedly defamatory statements were published within
the defendant public official's duties.34
The Times case dealt with civil liability for libel, not with criminal liability.s5
The decision involved itself with the official conduct of a public official, not his
private life. 6 The opinion involved a public official, but the court clearly in-
dicated that the constitutional protection was not limited to public officials or to
their official conduct or to cases of civil libel.3 " The Court made reference to a
broader application of its newly reasoned decision: "[F]reedom of expression
upon public questions is secured by the First Amendment.... " Though clearly
limiting the "actual malice" rule to public officials performing their official duties,
in the Times case, the Court implied that the constitutional privilege should not
be limited to public officials, but that the proper criterion for application of the
rule might be whether a "public question" was involved.
At this point in time, the newly evolved rule could be stated as follows: a
publication defaming a private person is actionable if he merely shows damage to
his reputation in the community;3 9 the same publication defaming a public
official, however, is not actionable without a showing that the statements pub-
lished were false, and that the defendant knew them to be false or published the
statements with reckless disregard as to their truth or falsity.
B. The Development of the Times Principle in
Subsequent Supreme Court Decisions (Pre 1971)
In the Times case, the Court clearly determined that an elected city com-
missioner was a "public official" within the purview of the newly formulated
rule. The Court did not clearly establish, however, what criteria would be de-
terminative as to whether a person is a "public official." It left the door open
for further applications, but it relegated those applications to an ad hoc basis.
Subsequent to the Times decision, the Supreme Court determined that the
public official designation included (besides a city commissioner): a group of
Louisiana parish judges,"' a county attorney and chief of police, 1 private com-
32 Id. at 256-92.
33 See Armot., 20 A.L.R. 3d 988, 991 (1968).
34 Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959).
35 This point was decided in Garrison v. Louisiana,. 379 U.S. 64 (1964). The Court found
that the Times standard also applies to criminal libel.
36 The Court concerned itself with extending the standard where a purely private libel is
involved, but concerning a public official, in Ocala Star-Banner Co. v. Damron, 401 U.S. 295
(1971). See section IV, infra, for a more complete analysis.
37 376 U.S. 254, at 283, n.23.
38 Id. at 269 (emphasis added).
39 See 1 HARPER AND JAMES, supra note 12, at 350.
40 Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
41 Henryv. Collins, 380 U.S. 356 (1965).
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pany officials, a deputy sheriff, 3 members of a local school board,44 an elected
court clerk,4' and, most recently, a mayor,4" and a deputy chief of detectives.47
Finally, in Rosenblatt v. Baer,"s the Supreme Court gave some meaning to
the "public official" category. The Rosenblatt case concerned an action brought
by a retired county supervisor of a recreational area. The Court held that criti-
cism of official conduct, made after the official has left his position, will not pre-
clude the application of the Times principle where the question originally in-
volved concerned a matter of still lively public interest.4 9 The Court held that the
"public official" designation applies to all elected or appointed government em-
ployees who have, or appear to the public to have, substantial responsibility for,
or control over, the conduct of government affairs.5" In other words, anyone who
holds a position of sufficient importance that the public-at-large would be
especially interested in the discharge of his duties, is included in the "public
official" category.
Accompanying the increase in the scope of the "public official" category was
an extension of the application of the "actual malice" standard to persons other
than public officials. It would have been totally inconsistent with the Court's
stated purpose in the Times case to limit the "actual malice" rule solely to public
officials,5 and the subsequent extensions of the Times principle were, according
to some authorities, logical ones.52 In 1967, in Curtis Publishing 'Co. v. Butts,"
42 Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, 383 U.S. 53 (1966).
43 St. Amant v. Thompson. 390 U.S. 727 (1968).
44 Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
45 Beckley Newspapers Corp. v. Hanks, 389 U.S. 81 '(1967).
46 Ocala Star-Banner Co. v. Damron, 401 U.S. 295 (1971).
47 Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279 (1971).
48 383 U.S. 75 (1966).
49 Id. at 88, n.15.
50 Id. at 86-87. n.13.
51 Supra, note 38.
52 See T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 524 (1970); and see gen-
erally I HANSON, LIBEL AND RELATED TORTs '(1969).
53 Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967); and see its companion case, Asso-
ciated Press v. Walker. The Court did not agree upon an opinion. The plaintiff, Butts, was the
athletic director for the University of Georgia. He brought suit against the defendant for libel
based on charges that the plaintiff had "fixed" a football game between the universities of
Georgia and Alabama.
The jury verdict resulted in a judgment for plaintiff in the amount of $60,000 compensatory
damages and $400,000 punitive damages. The District Court denied the defendant's motion
for a new trial. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, 351 F.2d 702 (1965).
Five members of the Court voted for affirmance of the judgment of the Court of Appeals on
the grounds that the constitutional standards had been met.
The plaintiff Walker, a retired Army general, had been involved in various political activ-
ities, including taking personal command of federal troops during a school desegregation
confrontation at Little Rock, Arkansas, in 1957. He was extremely interested in the issue of
physical federal intervention. He instituted a libel action in a Texas court against the Asso-
ciated Press for statements made in a dispatch in which the dispatch stated that the plaintiff
had taken command of a violent crowd, had personally led a charge against federal marshals,
and had encouraged and advised the rioters.
A verdict of $500,000 compensatory damages and $300,000 punitive damages was awarded.
The trial court entered the compensatory award only. The Texas Court of Civil Appeals
affirmed the trial court's decision, 393 S.W.2d 671 (1965).
All members of the Court voted for reversal of the decision. Chief Justice Warren, and
Justices Brennan and White. expressed the view that 'the New York Times principle had not
been met. Justices Harlan, Clark, Stewart and Fortas rested their opinion on the grounds that
their standards - based on highly unreasonable conduct and phrased in terms of extreme
departure from standards of investigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to by reasonable




the Supreme Court officially applied Times' qualified privilege to defamatory
statements concerning public figures. In the Times case, the Court failed to
define the term, "public official" and left that to be determined later.54 In the
Butts case, the Court affectively broadened the application of the Times principle,
but vaguely defined a public figure as one who, either by position alone or through
some activity "amounting to a thrusting of his personality into the vortex of an
important public controversy,"" "commands sufficient continuing public interest
and has sufficient access to the means of counterargument to be able to expose
through discussion any falsehoods."56 Left without adequate guidance from
the Supreme Court, the lower courts formulated their own definitions of "public
figure.""7 In Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing v. Bresler5 the Supreme Court
ruled that an individual who voluntarily and actively involved himself in matters
of significant public concern is a public figure, and as such, must meet the burden
of the Times rule in order to recover damages.59 This latter definition of "public
figure" is the most precise definition the Supreme Court has yet deduced.
In Time, Inc. v. Hill,"0 the Supreme Court extended the Times rule to
invasion-of-privacy cases. The case involved a magazine article concerning a
play depicting events surrounding a family that had been held captive for several
hours by a group of escaped convicts. The Court held that, though the suit
was brought by a private family who had been involuntarily thrust into the
public eye, their private character did not preclude the application of the "actual
malice" test, and such application was necessary to protect the public's right to
information concerning newsworthy matters.6' The Court intimated in the Hill
decision that a different result might be reached if the case involved a libel action
brought by a private person involuntarily thrust into the limelight. 2
Throughout its decisions the Supreme Court has been concerned with the
broader question of whether an individual case involves a "public question,"6
rather than whether a public figure or public official has been involved. Lower
court decisions have extended the Times principle to "public interest" situations. 4
Where the public has a legitimate interest and personal concern in the matter,
it has a right to know and be informed about the matter. The focus is on the
context in which the plaintiff has been defamed, rather than his influence in the
community or his activities. The Supreme Court has recently placed its seal
of approval on this rationale and has extended the Times rule to libel suits involv-
ing private citizens who are involved in issues of public scrutiny.65 The individ-
54 Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966).
55 Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, supra note 53, at 155.
56 1 HANSON, supra note 52, at 108.
57 See section III, infra, generally for a discussion of this point.
58 398 U.S. 6 (1970).
59 Id. at 8-9.
60 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
61 Id.
62 Id. at 390-91. But see Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 39 U.S.L.W. 4694 (U.S. June
7, 1971), which essentially rejects this view, however. The Court has also applied the Times
rule to public officials even where the defamatory remarks involve private libel. See Ocala
Star-Banner Co. v. Damron, 401 U.S. 295 (1971).
63 Supra, note 38.
64 For a discussion of this application see section III (C), infra.
65 See the discussion of Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 39 U.S.L.W. 4694 (U.S. June 7,
1971) in section V, infra.
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ual's status in relation to the public controversy no longer controls Times' ap-
plicability.
In any suit for defamation, a plaintiff needs to prove the defamatory
remarks actually damaged his reputation. A plaintiff who finds himself within the
purview of the Times privilege must additionally prove that the statements were
made with actual malice. The problem here is what does actual malice really
mean. Prior to 1964 "actual malice" meant ill will, spite or intent to injure.68
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan7 held that the common law definition was con-
stitutionally inadequate, and defined "actual malice" as being a knowing false-
hood or a reckless disregard for the truth or falsity of the statement. " The first
part of this definition is self-explanatory; i.e., that the defendant knew the
material to be false or entertained a high degree of awareness of its falsity.69
The second half, "reckless disregard," has been the subject of much examination
and re-definition. The failure to check the accuracy of the information published
with material in the defendant's possession,"0 the lack of ordinary care in making
charges against the plaintiff,". the failure to make a prior investigation of the
facts,7 2 or mere negligences is not sufficient evidence of "reckless disregard for
the truth or falsity of the statements" made. "There must be sufficient evidence
to permit the conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as
to the truth of the publication." 74 If the statements are "so inherently improbable
that only a reckless man would have put them in circulation," failure to check
beyond the source of the story will constitute reckless disregard for truth.7 5 The
Court, in St. Amant v. Thompson,"0 by way of dictum, suggested that a verdict
would be upheld if the defamatory statements were based on information from a
source that the publisher knew or should have known to be unreliable-as, for
example, information based solely on an anonymous unverified phone call. But
this notion may not hold much water in light of Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy.7
The Court held in that case that it was not necessary for a publisher or author to
check out a story phoned in to him by an unverified informer . 7  To require an
investigation of every controversial matter, the Court reasoned, would unduly
hinder the publication of newsworthy items.
There is a general flaw in this area of defamation (the actual malice test
included) in that there are no real guidelines by which lower courts can determine
if a certain course of action constitutes actionable libel on the defendant's part.
The problem is unresolved until the Supreme Court, as the final arbiter or "jury,"
66 See PaossEa, supra note 5, at 814.
67 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
68 Id. at 279-80.
69 Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 153 (1967) ; Garrison v. Louisiana, 379
U.S. 64, 75 (1964).
70 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 287-88 (1964).
71 Garrisonv. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 79 (1964).
72 St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968).
73 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
74 St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968).
75 Id. at 732.
76 390 U.S. 727 (1968).




determines whether there is "sufficient evidence" of reckless disregard for truth.79
Even within the Court there is a discrepancy as to what specific circumstances
constitute "actual malice."80
Despite the clear language of the Supreme Court opinions this area of law
remains in what seems like a perpetual state of flux. The jury may examine the
specifics of a particular case, and through application of a "reasonableness" test,
determine whether there was intent to injure through falsehood.8 ' But whether
the jury has decided "correctly" cannot be determined until the Supreme Court
has decided if the facts of the case indicate an intent to injure through falsehood.
There is a notion implicit in all of the Court's decisions that an absolute standard
cannot be formulated, and that determinations must continue to be made on an
ad hoc basis. Therein lies the Times principle's greatest weakness.
C. The Lower Courts' Application of the Times Principle
The Supreme Court has determined that specific types of individuals are
"public officials" and must overcome the constitutional privilege accorded by the
First Amendment, 2 but the Court has only vaguely enunciated any criteria upon
which to determine if an individual is a public official. The lower courts, in
turn, have exercised a great deal of imagination in their determinations of the
applicability of the Times principle.
The public official category now includes all individuals who are associated
in any way with any level of government." And, as was the case in Rosenblatt
v. Baer,"4 the lower courts have also found the Times standard applicable even
79 See 1 HANSON, supra note 52, at 117. See also Mr. Justice Black's opinion in Curtis
Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, at 171-72 (1967).
80 See, e.g., Justice Harlan's "highly unreasonable conduct" test, and Chief Justice Warren's
"reckless disregard" test - the failure to investigate a story adequately with full knowledge of
the resulting harm - in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, at 133 and 162, respec-
tively.
81 Henry v. Collins, 380 U.S. 356 (1965); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
82 See notes 40 through 47.
83 The lower courts have included many types of individuals within the public official
category: Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. v. Church. 103 Ariz. 582, 447 P.2d 840 (1968) (state
attorney general); Tagawa v. Maui Publishing Co., 448 P.2d 337 (Hawaii 1968) (member of
a county board of supervisors); Coursey v. Greater Niles Twp. Publishing Corp., 40 Ill. 2d 257,
239 N.E.2d 837 '(1968) (city patrolman); Tunnell v. Edwardsville Intelligencer, Inc., 99 II.
App. 2d 1, 241 N.E.2d 28 (1968) (city attorney); Ryan v. Dionne, 28 Conn. Supp. 35, 248
A.2d 583 (1968) (city's delinquent tax collector); Bienvenue v. Angelle, 254 La. 182, 223
So. 2d 140 (1969) (parish director of public welfare); Brown v. Kitterman, 443 S.W.2d 146
(Mo. 1969) '(manager of community center); Turley v. W. T. A. X., Inc., 94 Ill. App. 2d 377,
236 N.E.2d 778 (1968) (professional architect involved in the construction of a county
building); Theckston v. Triangle Publications, Inc., 100 N.J. Super. 452, 242 A.2d 629 (1968)
(clerk of district court).
Those individuals not classified as public officials include: Afro-American Publishing Co.
v. Jaffe, 366 F.2d 649, 658 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (pharmacists); Gibson v. Kincaid, 221 N.E.2d
834 (Ill. App. 1966) (part-time radio announcer); McKinnon v. Smith, 52 Misc. 2d 349, 275
N.Y.S.2d 900 (1966) (members of a labor union); Fignole v. Curtis Publishing Co., 247 F.
Supp. 595, 597-98 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (campaign worker in election in Haiti); Lorillard v. Field
Enterprises, Inc., 65 Ill. App. 2d 65, 77-78, 213 N.E.2d 1, 7 (1965) (socialites); Faulk v.
Aware, Inc., 14 N.Y.2d 954, 202 N.E.2d 372 '(1964) (radio and television performer); Zeck
v. Sprio, 52 Misc. 2d 629, 276 N.Y.S.2d 395 (Sup. Ct. 1966) (attorney retained by local admin-
istrative board); Mason v. Sullivan, 26 App. Div. 2d 115, 271 N.Y.S.2d 314 (1966) (enter-
tainers).
84 383 U.S. 75 (1966).
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though the plaintiff was no longer a public official at the time the defamatory
statements were made.85 They have applied the Times principle to appointed, as
well as elected, public offidals8 6 Prior to the Supreme Court's adoption of the
"'actual mali~e" standard to candidates for public office, 87 the lower courts firmly
included candidates as being within the purview of the public official category.88
The courts have generally looked at the duties entrusted to an individual with a
government related job to determine if he is a "public official," and in so doing,
have applied the Times rule even to minor government officials.89
Along with the increase in the scope of the public official category came an
extension of the actual malice standard to public figures. A "public figure' was
defined as a person who publicly, conspicuously, actively, and as a leader; thrust
himself into a public discussion of public and/or controversial matters.9 "' The
courts have held that sports personalities,9 underworld figures involved in
political campaigns, 2 a professor who made statements on a nuclear test ban
treaty," political party workers,9 the law partner of a mayor of a city,95 and a
head football coach at the University of Washingto 98 are all included, among
others, within the "public figure7' designation. 7 In Afro-American Publishing
Co. v. Jaffe,98 however, the Times principle was held not to extend to a phar-
macist operating a local drugstore, which was a retail outlet for publications.
The Times nile, it was held, does not preclude recovery in a libel suit by a man
who was not voluntarily thrust into the vortex of controversy. A man who has
not mounted a public rostrum, sought public assistance, or organized any type of
group activity"9 is a private person, and the Times standard is, therefore, inap-
plicable.
Prior to Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.,' the lower courts had recognized
a greater application of the Times standard than simply the public official or
public figure categories. One of the leading cases on the public interest standard
85 See Hackworth v. Larson, 165 N.W.2d 705 (S.D. 1969); Powell v. Monitor Publishing
Co., 107 N.H. 83, 217 A.2d 193 (1966); and Nusbaum v. Newark Morning Ledger Co., 86
N.J. Super. 132, 206 A.2d 185 '(1965).
86 Eadie v. Pole, 91 N.J. Super. 504, 221 A.2d 547 (1966).
87 See the discussion of Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy and Ocala Star-Banner Co. v. Damron
in section IV, infra.
88 Sas Jaworsky v. Padfield, 211 So. 2d 122 (La. App. 196 8 ); Phifer v. Foe, 443 P.2d870 (Wyo. 1968); Tilton v. Cowles Publishing Co., 76 Wash.- 2d 875, 459 P.2d 8 (f969).
89 See Walker v. Courier-Journal and Louisville Times Co., 246 F. Supp. 231 (W. D. Ky.
1965).
90 Pauling v. National Review, Inc., 49 Misc. 2d 975, 269 N.Y.S.2d 11 (1966).
91 Cepeda v. Cowles Magazines and Broadcasting; Inc., 392 F.2d 417 (9th Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 840 '(1968). Public figures included "anyone who is famous or infamous
because of who he is or what he has done." Id. at 418.
92 Time, Inc. v. McLaney, 406 F.2d 565 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 922
(1969).
93 Pauling v. Globe-Democrat Publishing Co., 362 F.2d 188 (8th Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
388 U.S. 909 (1967).
94 Arber v. Stahlin, 10 Mich. App. 181, 159 N.W.2d 154 (1968).
95 Gilberg v. Goffi, 2"1 App. Div. 2d 517, 251 N.Y.S.2d 823 (1964), afl'd, 15 N.Y.2d 1024,
260 N.Y.S.2d 29 (1965).
96 Grayson v. Curtis Publishing Co., 72 Wash. 2d 999, 436 P.2d 756 '(1967).
97 See authority collected in Annot., 19 A.L.R. 3d 1361 (1968) and Annot., 20 A.L.R. 3d
988 (1968) for an excellent synopsis of cases in the area.
98 366 F.2d 649 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
99 Id. ,
100 39 U.S.L.W. 4694 (U.S. June 7, 1971).
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is United Medical Laboratories, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System.",' In
this case, the plaintiff sued for libel arising out of allegedly defamatory statements
made in defendant's documentary film, which insinuated that the plaintiff's
laboratory testing was inaccurate and incompetent. The court held that the
plaintiff's activities-since they concerned a question of public health-were
clearly within the realm of the "public interest" standard, that the Times rule
applied to public questions, and that plaintiff must overcome the obstacle of the
Times privilege in order to recover damages.0 2 The decision marked a clear
expansion beyond the public figure and public official categories.
In Arizona Biochemical Co. v. Hearst Corp.,' the court there reached a
similar result. Plaintiff, who was involved in the garbage collection business, was
implicated as a Mafia figure in an article in the "Albany Times Union." The
court held the Times privilege applicable and found the plaintiff's activities to
be within the "public interest" category. Noting that garbage collection con-
stitutes "essential services for the welfare and health of the inhabitants,"'". rather
than the public's obvious interest in curtailing underworld activities, the court
found the plaintiff was involved in the quasi-governmental activity of garbage
collection."0 5
To fall within the public figure category an individual must "thrust himself
into the vortex of an important public controversy."' An individual, not neces-
sarily in the vortex of a public controversy, may be deemed subject to the Times
rule, however, if, in some manner, he involved himself in the controversy.'
Under the public interest category, the true test is whether the controversy is of
sufficient public interest to warrant constitutional protection, regardless of the
individual's position in the community.' 8
The development and application of the actual malice standard has been
largely commensurate with the Supreme Court's redefinitions and applications.
The "actual malice" standard requires that, in order to find liability, the publisher
must be aware of the falseness of his statements, or at least have questioned the
credibility of his sources, and have nevertheless acted irresponsibly in the pub-
lication of the defamatory statements.0 9 The plaintiff must demonstrate this
actual malice by "clear and convincing proof.""' The Supreme Court has ruled
that, in order to find liability, the false and defamatory statements must apply to
specific circumstances. Where a District Attorney levelled blanket indictments of
incompetence and mediocrity against a group of Louisiana parish judges the
101 404 F.2d 706 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 921 (1969).
102 Id. at 711-12.
103 302 F. Supp. 412 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
104 Id. at 415.
105 See also Ragano v. Time, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 1005 '(M.D. Fla. 1969); Blanke v. Time,
Inc., 308 F. Supp. 378 (E.D. La. 1970).
106 See Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 154 (1967); see also Dacey v. Florida
Bar, Inc., 427 F.2d 1292, 1295 (5th Cir. 1970).
107 See Bon Air Hotel, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 426 F.2d 858, 862 (5th Cir. 1970).
108 United Medical Laboratories, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 404 F.2d 706, 710-
11, 713-14 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 921 (1969).
109 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 287 (1964); see also Ragano v. Time,
Inc., 302 F. Supp. 1005, 1010 '(M.D. Fla. 1969); Time, Inc. v. McLaney, 406 F.2d 565, 572
(5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 922 (1969).
110 Wasserman v. Time Inc., 424 F.2d 920, 922 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Cerrito v. Time, Inc.,
302 F. Supp. 1071, 1075 (N.D. Cal. 1969).
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Court determined that though a select group of individuals was involved, the
charges themselves were not specific enough to meet the "actual malice" test."'
Though the burden in civil cases is proof by a preponderance of the
evidence, it would appear that the Supreme Court-through the narrowly con-
strued but liberally applied "actual malice" standard-might well require the
plaintiff to prove his cause beyond a "mere!' preponderance of the evidence.
This is borne out by the rarity of decisions which have found sufficient evidence
of actual malice.
12
IV. The Recent Expansive Triology
On February 24, 1971, the Supreme Court handed down a trilogy of
decisions" expounding upon the Times principle, while necessarily expanding
the proposition that Times has come to represent.
The first case, Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy," 4 arose from events surrounding
the 1960 New Hampshire Democratic primary election. On September 10, 1960,
just three days prior to the primary election of candidates for the United States
Senate, the "Concord Monitor," a daily newspaper in Concord, New Hamp-
shire, published a syndicated column, written by Drew Pearson, entitled "D.C.
Merry-Go-Round," which discussed the upcoming election. The column spoke
of the criminal records of what it called the "motley assortment of candidates.""'
Alphonse Roy, a former U.S. Marshal, was characterized as a "former small-time
bootlegger.""' 6 Mr. Roy, who subsequently lost his bid in the primary, sued the
Monitor Patriot Company and the North American Newspaper Alliance
(NANA), the distributor of the column, for libel. The circumstances surrounding
this particular report are quite interesting. Pearson received information of
Roy's purported criminal record from an unverified source sometime between
August 24-26. The charge of being a former bootlegger was not publicly made
until September 10. Obviously, this was not a "hot news" item where the
columnist or the newspaper had not the time to check out the story. The alleged
activities occurred 37 years before the publication. In actuality, it was the
plaintiff's brother who had been involved in "bootlegging" during the Prohibi-
tion era." 7 The story, as it related to the plaintiff, was completely false. A
simple investigation would have borne this out, but no such investigation was
ever conducted.
The lower court's instructions to the jury are also quite interesting in that
they illustrate the extent of inventiveness the courts have shown in attempting
to establish concrete criteria to find liability, or to absolve defendants from
111 See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 78-79 (1964).
112 See Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 156 (1967); Ragano v. Time, Inc.,
302 F. Supp. 1005, 1009-10 (M.D. Fla. 1969); Mahnke v. Northwest Publications, Inc., 280
Minn. 328, 160 N.W.2d 1 (1968).
113 Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265 (1971); Ocala Star-Banner Co. v. Damron,
401 U.S. 295 (1971); Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279 (1971).
114 401 U.S. 265 (1971).
115 See id. at 266-68, n.1, for the text of the portion of the column concerning the New
Hampshire primary.
116 Id.




liability. First, the trial judge instructed the jury that the plaintiff's status as a
political candidate included him in the "public official" category, and that, as
long as the false statements related to his "official" conduct as opposed to his
"private" conduct, Roy must meet the "actual malice" test before he could
recover damages. If the libel was in the "public sector," the jury should find for
the defendant-distributor since plaintiff failed to prove by clear and convincing
proof that the distributor acted with actual malice. But, as to the newspaper,
they had to decide on the preponderance of the evidence whether it was liable.
If the libel was in the "private sector," there were two defenses: (1) truth; and
(2) "conditional privilege" if the article was false but published with a reason-
able belief in its veracity.118 The jury returned a verdict of $20,000, of which
$10,000 was against the newspaper and $10,000 against the defendant-distributor
-thus finding the libel to be within the "private sector." An appeal was taken.
The New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, finding that the
jury was properly guided by the trial judge's instructions." 9 The Supreme Court
(the majority spoke through Mr. Justice Stewart in all three decisions) held that
"publications concerning candidates [seeking public office] must be accorded at
least as much protection under the First and Fourteenth Amendments as those
concerning occupants of public office."' 20 Further, it was held:
as a matter of constitutional law that a charge of criminal conduct, no matter
how remote in time or place, can never be irrelevant to an official's or a
candidate's fitness for office for purposes of application of the "knowing
falsehood or reckless disregard" rule of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan."21
But in finding a criminal charge relevant to a candidate's fitness for office, the
Court found itself in clear contradiction to the New Hampshire Supreme Court's
finding, and therefore reversed that court's decision.
In Garrison v. Louisiana,"2 the Court held that "anything which might
touch on an official's fitness for office" is relevant."' The Court, in that case
necessarily referred to an office holder. Here, the Court simply extended this
rationale to candidates for public office. The fact that plaintiff was harmed in
his private reputation as well as his public reputation will not relieve his burden
of proving actual malice. 4
The Supreme Court never wished to relegate the application of the Times
principle solely to cases involving public officials, or "official conduct," or to
conventional civil libel suits."' In this case, while effectively extending the con-
stitutional protection of the Times principle to candidates for public office, the
Court officially sanctioned what lower courts had, on their own volition, recog-
118 See generally 401 U.S. 265, at 268-70.
119 Roy v. Monitor Patriot Co., 109 N.H. 441, 254 A.2d 832 (1969).
120 Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 271 (1971).
121 Id. at 277.
122 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
123 Id. at 76-77.
124 This attitude permeates throughout the Court's decisions, and has existed from the time
of the Times ruling.
125 See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S.
130 (1967); Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Association v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6 (1970).
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nized for years. 2" If failed, however, to more clearly define the criteria for actual
malice. By implication, it held that the failure to check a story called in to a
reporter by an unverified source did not constitute actual malice. Remoteness in
time of an allegedly criminal activity has no bearing on its relevance. The fact
that there was a substantial span of time between receipt of the defamatory in-
formation and its actual publication, and that at least a cursory check of the
information is standard operating procedure in the newspaper industry where
the matter involved is not an extraordinarily "hot news" item,12 carried little
weight in the Court's final determination. The Court, in reversing the earlier
judgment, found the jury instructions inherently deficient, and ruled that the
jury was incorrectly allowed to make its own unguided determinations as to the
"relevance" of the purported prior criminal activity.
The second case, Ocala Star-Banner Co. v. Damron,' involved a matter
of mistaken identity. On April 18, 1966, the defendant published an article
in its local daily newspaper, the "Star-Banner," in which it related details of
plaintiff's involvement in, and indictment for, perjury in a federal civil rights
suit. 29 The plaintiff was, at the time of the publication, the major of Crystal
City, Florida, and also a candidate for the office of county tax assessor. The story,
in actuality, involved the plaintiff's brother. The plaintiff was subsequently
defeated in his bid for county tax assessor. He sued the Star-Banner Company
for libel asking for $50,000 as compensatory damages and $500,000 as punitive
damages in the Circuit Court of Marion County, Florida, alleging that the
article was "libelous per se," and that it caused him "irreparable damages to
his reputation, as an individual, public officer, candidate for public office and as
a businessman."'3 0 At the close of the evidence, Damron moved for a directed
verdict on the issue of liability, and the trial judge granted the motion. The case
then went to the jury on the issue of damages. The judge instructed the jury
that the charge was libelous per se and that the plaintiff (respondent here) could
recover damages without showing malice, thus implicitly finding the publication
to constitute private libel. The jury awarded compensatory damages of $22,000.
The Star-Banner Company moved for a new trial on the grounds that the Times
"actual malice" test applied to the facts of this case. The trial judge denied the
motion on the ground that the article did not refer to respondent's official con-
duct. The Florida District Court of Appeals affirmed, holding the Times rule
inapplicable.' The Supreme Court of Florida refused to review the judgment.'
The Court was urged to accept the contention that the Times rule applied
only to "official conduct,"' 3 and that an indictment for perjury arising out of
testimony given during a civil rights suit, not related in any manner to plaintiff's
administrative duties, nor to his status as a candidate for political office, was
126 See supra, note 88.
127 These facts were derived from the parties' briefs and the general facts of the case.
128 401 U.S. 295 (1971).
129 See id. at 296, n.1 for the text of the publication.
130 Id. at 297.
131 Ocala Star-Banner Co. v. Damron, 221 So. 2d 459, 461 (Fla. App. 1969).
132 Ocala Star-Banner Co. v. Damron, 231 So. 2d 822 (Fla. 1970).
133 See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, at 283, n.23; see 401 U.S. at 300.
NOTES[Vol. 47:153]
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
private libel;".4 the court first determined that the respondent was a "public
official" since he was the mayor of Crystal City, and as such, must meet the
"actual malice" test to recover damages. 3 ' The Court reinforced its determina-
tion by stating that the Times principle would also apply to the respondent since
he was also a candidate for political office.1 6 The Court then held, citing
Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy:2
3
7
that a charge of criminal conduct against an official or candidate, no matter
how remote in time or place, is always "relevant to his fitness for office" for
purposes of applying the New York Times rule of knowing falsehood or
reckless disregard for the truth."58
Lastly, the Court found that a specific charge of perjury is relevant to an official's,
or a candidate's, fitness for office," 9 and that a plaintiff who finds himself under
public scrutiny must meet the Times test before recovery of damages can be
awarded-even where the false publication concerns an essentially private libel.1
The case now appears to have been finally disposed of by summary judgment
proceedings in Florida,'4' where the plaintiff, Damron, failed to controvert
affidavits which purported to demonstrate that there was no material issue of
fact as to the Supreme Court's standard of constitutional malice.
The fact that a check of the facts to determine the truth of the statements
is usually made; and the fact that the editor who printed the story had close to
40 years experience in the newspaper business, and therefore, was clearly aware
of standard operating procedures; and lastly, the failure to make such an in-
vestigation, examined collectively, still failed to constitute "recklessness." The
Court implicitly re-affirmed its conviction that actual malice must be of "con-
vincingly clear clarity,"'' and that mere negligence in operation is insufficient to
constitute "reckless disregard" for truth.
The third case, Time, Inc. v. Pape,4 ' involved a libel action against a well-
known weekly newsmagazine for allegedly distorting the contents of a U.S. Com-
mission on Civil Rights report. In its 1961 report-one of a series of reports
entitled, "Justice"-the Commission discussed "police brutality and related
private violence." Within its discussion, the Commission mentioned the case of
Monroe v. Pape'. in a section entitled: "Search, Seizure, and Violence: Chicago,
1958."' 4 The section spoke of a civil rights complaint filed against several
Chicago policemen, headed by Deputy Chief of Detectives Pape.'46 "Time"
134 The argument was deduced generally from the respondent's brief and Mr. Justice
Stewart's remarks in his opinion.
135 Ocala Star-Banner Co. v. Damron, 401 U.S. 295, at 299 (1971).
136 Id. And see Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265 (1971).
137 401 U.S. 265'(1971).
138 Ocala Star-Banner Co. v. Damron, 401 U.S. 295, 300 (1971).
139 Id. at 301.
140 Id. at 300.
141 Damron v. Ocala Star-Banner Company, No. 14,659- ...... Fla. Supp. ...... (1971).
142 See 376 U.S. at 285-86. See also 389 U.S. at 83.
143 401 U.S. 279 (1971).
144 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
145 See 401 U.S. 279, at 280, for the complete text of the paragraph.
146 In his complaint, Monroe alleged that a group of Chicago policemen, led by Pape, forced
their way into his home; roused his wife and himself out of bed in the middle of the night;
physically struck him and called him "nigger" and "black boy"; assaulted his children; ran-
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magazine carried an article on this latest Commission report shortly thereafter'4
What had previously been allegations made in a plaintiff's pleadings now ap-
peared as empirical facts.
P'ape later sued the defendant (petitioner here) for libel. The district court
granted "Time's" motion for summary judgment on the ground that the article
was fair comment on a government report, and therefore, constitutionally priv-
ileged. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed. 48 The Supreme
Court then decided New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.'49 The district court, armed
with the newly formulated Times rule, granted "Time's motion for summary
judgment again. The Court of Appeals reversed, ruling that the issue of whether
the slanting of the contents of the Commission report constituted "actual malice"
still needed to be decided. 5 At trial, the author of the article and the Time's
researcher admitted they had substantially altered the wording of the report, but
insisted that the report's real meaning had not been changed. At the close of
the evidence, the trial judge directed a verdict for "Time."'' The Court of
Appeals reversed again, ruling that a jury trial was needed to decide the precise
question of whether the omission of the word "alleged" constituted "actual
malice."'5 2 The respective courts found Pape to be a "public official," and his
actions involved his "official conduct," but they differed as to the application of
the Times principle.
The case presented the issue of whether the Court of Appeals had correctly
determined, upon the facts of the case, whether "Time's" activities, taken as a
whole, constituted knowing falsehood or reckless disregard for truth. Where
there is a situation of "indirect" reporting, the Court recognized the possibility of
having various interpretations of the same underlying facts.' 8 The Court stated:
where the source of the news engages in qualifying the information released,
complexities ramify. Any departure from full direct quotation of the source,
with all its qualifying language, inevitably confronts the publisher with a
set of choices.154
The Court found the Commission report "bristling with ambiguities."' 55 While
the report attempted to portray the facts it reported as objectively as possible, the
Court found the Commission interjected its own beliefs and attitudes throughout
the report. 6 The Court reasoned that "since the series of incidents described
in the report were the only evidence the Commission presented in support of its
findings and recommendations, there was a logically inevitable implication that
the Commission must have believed that the incidents described actually oc-
sacked the house; held him on "open" charges for ten hours; exhibited him in lineups; did not
bring him before a magistrate; did not advise him of his constitutional rights; nor was he per-
mitted to call his family or an attorney.
147 See 401 U.S. 279, at 281, for pertinent parts of the "Time" article.
148 Papev. Time, Inc., 318 F.2d 652 (7th Cir. 1963).
149 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
150 Pape v. Time, Inc., 354 F.2d 558 (7th Cir. 1965).
151 Pape v. Time, Inc., 294 F. Supp. 1087 *(N.D. II. 1969).
152 Pape v. Time, Inc., 419 F.2d 980 (7th Cir. 1969).
153 Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279, at 286 (1971).
154 Id.
155 Id. at 290.
156 Id- at 288.
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curred."' 5  "Time" might be justified, therefore, in interpreting and reporting the
Commission's report as if it was stating historical facts.
The Court then focused its attention on the need for the constitutional pro-
tection afforded by the Times case to negligent falsification of fact.' "This pro-
tection, however, would not exist for errors of interpretation should the analysis
of the Court of Appeals be adopted," cautioned the Court, "for once a jury was
satisfied that the interpretation was 'wrong,' the error itself would be sufficient to
justify a verdict for the plaintiff."' 59 Finally, the Court concluded that upon the
facts of this case, plaintiff has the burden of showing that the defendant "en-
tertained serious doubts as to the truth of the publication" before liability could be
imposed. 6 ° While the choice of this particular interpretation might reflect a
misconception, the Court conceded, it was not enough to create a jury question
of actual malice under the Times rule. Such a creation would impose a "much
stricter standard of liability on errors of interpretation or judgment than on
errors of historic fact."'' In deciding that the Times rule had not been properly
applied, and reversing the Court of Appeals decision, the Court ruled that the
plaintiff had failed to provide sufficient evidence of "actual malice."' 6 2 "'Time's'
conduct reflected at most an error of judgment."' 63 If "the freedoms of expression
are to have the breathing space that they need to survive,"' 6 4 misstatemenfs of
this kind must have the protection of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. In
order to insure the ascertainment and publication of the truth about public
affairs, it is "essential that the First Amendment protect some erroneous ublica-
tions as well as true ones. '
'i65
While the Court specifically stated that the ruling in this case is confined
to the specific facts of this case, 66 one cannot wonder whether this latter case
may have opened the door to constitutional protection of deliberately reported
falsification. The simple excuse that the defendant thought the comments made
to be a rational interpretation and conclusion of the report, without further
investigation, appears to be sufficient in itself to condone any falsifications.
Roy, Damron, and Pape have marked a significant step in the further ex-
pansion of the Times rule, and in so doing, have won three more skirmishes for
the side of the First and Fourteenth Amendments in their one-sided legal battle
against what the Supreme Court reasons are constitutionally deficient state libel
and slander laws.
V. Rosenbloom u. Metromedia, Inc.: The Public Interest Standard
Where do we go from here? This question was quickly answered by the
Supreme Court on June 7, 1971. Until that point the Court had basically
157 Id. at 289.
158 Id. at 291. See also New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, at 269 (1964).
159 Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279, 291 (1971).
160 See St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968).
161 Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279, at 290 (1971).
162 Id. at 292.
163 Id.
164 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271-72 (1964).
165 St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 732 '(1968).
166 Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279, at 292 (1971).
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relegated its decisions, where it applied the Times standard, to cases involving
"public figures" or "public officials" or "candidates for public office." The
Rosenbloom case presented the precise question of whether the Times "actual
malice" standard applies to a private individual involved in an incident of public
interest.117
Plaintiff, a distributor of nudist magazines, had been arrested by the
Philadelphia police on an obscenity charge. He brought suit seeking injunctive
relief prohibiting further police interference with his business, claiming that his
publications were not in fact obscene. The defendant radio station had broad-
cast various news reports concerning the plaintiff's implication (among others) in
the city-wide crackdown on distributors of allegedly obscene literature,' 6 and
had also made several broadcasts concerning the suit, and had falsely implied that
the suit was to stop all future prosecutions of "smut dealers," whereas the actual
purpose was to enjoin further harassment of the plaintiff' " The respondent,
throughout its broadcasts, implicitly characterized the plaintiff as one of several
"girlie book peddlers" and a distributor of "smut" and "obscene literature."
Following plaintiff's acquittal of criminal obscenity charges, he filed suit for libel
against the defendant. The district court held the Times standard inapplicable
and applied Pennsylvania law in arriving at the defendant's liability. Plaintiff re-
covered $25,000 compensatory damages and $250,000 punitive damages for the
allegedly defamatory broadcasts.' The Court of Appeals for the Third District
held the Times standard applicable and reversed the judgment for damages.m '
In a 5 to 3 decision (Mr. Justice Douglas taking no part in the decision), the
Court held the Times principle clearly applicable to state civil libel actions
brought by private individuals for defamatory falsehoods related to their involve-
ment in events of public interest or concern.7 2 The Court, speaking through Mr.
Justice Bemnan, could see no logical basis for limiting the constitutional privilege
solely to public officials or figures. The Court stated:
Whether the person involved is a famous large scale magazine distributor
or a "private" businessman running a corner newsstand has no relevance in
ascertaining whether the public has an interest in the issue. We honor the
commitment to robust debate on public issues, which is embodied in the
First Amendment, by extending constitutional protection to all discussion
and communication involving matters of public or general concern, without
regard to whether the persons involved are famous or anonymous. 37
Once establishing the applicability of the Times principle, the Court deter-
mined whether-from the facts of the case-the defendant acted with knowledge
of the falsity of the statements or with reckless disregard for truth. Nowhere was
it shown, the Court concluded, that the defendant entertained serious doubts as
167 Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 39 U.S.L.W. 4694 (U.S. June 7, 1971).
168 Id. at 4695.
169 Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 415 F.2d 892, 893-94 (3d Cir. 1969).
170 Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 289 F. Supp. 737, 749 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
171 415 F.2d 892 (3d Cir. 1969).
172 Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 39 U.S.L.W. 4694, 4702 (U.S. June 7, 1971).
173 Id. at 4699. The Court formally recognized what lower courts and certain authorities
had already recognized as being a logical extension of the Times principle. See T. EMERSON,
THE Sysnms oF FREEmDo or ExPREssioN 531-32, 540 (1970).
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to the truth of the reports they published, and in the absence of any such proof,
the decision of the Court of Appeals must be affirmed." 4 But the Court, while
extending the privilege to false statements defaning private individuals who are
involved in newsworthy events, failed to set any guidelines as to what might be
considered an issue of general concern. 5 In the future, it would appear, judicial
determinations as to what is a public question will continue to be made on an
ad hoc basis. Thus the Court continues to operate as a final arbiter or jury in all
constitutional libel cases.
Mr. Justice White, in a concurring opinion, felt that the constitutional
protections afforded by the First Amendment applied to comments made "upon
the official actions of public servants in full detail, with no requirement that the
reputation or the privacy of an individual involved in or affected by the official
action be spared from public view.""' Since the defendant acted within the
limits of propriety as sanctioned by the First Amendment, there could be no
liability.' Mr. Justice Harlan, in a dissenting opinion, while still supporting
the principle of law established in the Time's case, felt that private libel could
and should be properly dealt with by state libel laws, that the states should define
the limits of responsible activity, so long as liability is not imposed without fault,
and that a showing of damage is requisite to recovery in libel suits.' Mr.
Justice Marshall (joined by Mr. Justice Stewart), in a dissenting opinion,
recognized the basic conflict between a "free and unfettered press," and the
rights of an individual citizen to be free from unlawful invasion of his privacy
and wrongful derogation of his reputation."' Marshall stated that the majority's
attempt to reconcile these diverse worlds "by creating a conditional constitu-
tional privilege for defamation published in connection" with a matter of public
interest was substantially inadequate where a private individual was concerned. 8
Part of the problem is that nearly anyone can arguably be considered a "public
person," and the failure of the court to provide any adequate guidelines by which
the lower courts can determine the scope of a public question does nothing to
clarify the issue. The inadequacies of the majority's decision, Marshall con-
cluded, far outweigh any worthwhile adjudication the Court might have hoped
to achieve.'81
At this point in time, it appears that the Supreme Court has included the
maximum number of classes of individuals whom the Times decision may have
alluded to. By any standards, it is quite evident that in the last year alone the
Times rule has enjoyed a far wider application than could ever have been im-
agined from a simple investigation of the original decision.
174 Id. at 4703.
175 Id. at 4699. And see Mr. Justice Marshall's dissenting opinion beginning at 4710.
176 Id. at 4705.
177 Id.
178 Id. At 4706, he states: "(W)here the purpose and effect of the law is to redress actual
and measurable injury to private individuals... there is no necessary conflict with the values of
freedom of speech."






The question can now truly be asked: "Where do we go from here?" There
appear to be two avenues through which the Times decision can progress: (1) a
blanket application of the "actual malice" standard throughout the area of
defamation (regardless of any public issue); or (2) the adoption of an absolute
privilege.
The more recent decisions have extended the Times rule to its furthest ap-
plications, and yet kept it still within the "public sector." Within its present
context, the courts will probably concern themselves with a case by case examina-
tion of individual circumstances to determine if public questions are involved. A
significant move now would be. to bring actions brought by individuals not
engaged in public issues within the purview of the "actual malice" standard.
The other logical approach would be that which has been espoused by Mr.
Justices Douglas and Black since the Times case,182 and recently reiterated in the
Rosenbloom case. 8 That is, to convey an absolute constitutional privilege of
fair comment on matters of public concern to the news media. In other words,
the press would be allowed to make any comments it wished on any public issue,
and the threat of suit would be alleviated. This may be too extreme a move,
however, for the relatively conservative Court. But if the Court were to expand
Times' constitutional protections-beyond mere adjudications as to whether
particular fact patterns involved matters of public interest-the adoption of an
absolute privilege might well be its next step.
Philip S. DiMatteo*
182 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 293-97 (1964); Mr. Justice Goldberg
also joined in this opinion, at 297.
183 Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.. 39 U.S.L.W. 4694, 4703 (U.S. June 7, 1971); Mr.
Justice Black alone rendered an opinion here.
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